Threat Perceptions after the Kursk Incursion (October 15, 2024)

Update on threat perceptions & SMO support in Russia post Kursk-incursion. We saw clear increase in personal threat perception among respondents in our survey, followed by a decrease from late Sep. Meanwhile, minimal immediate change in threat perception with respect to infrastructure.
We observe nothing conclusive in terms of SMO support, which remains fairly steady (though perhaps a small decrease in "somewhat support"?).
Ministry of Defense approval ratings remain fairly even - perhaps a small increase in dissatisfaction post-Kursk, but nothing major. MoD approval, as always, is much lower than approval for Putin and SMO in general.
The same caveats as usual apply to this data: shows averages that have not been re-weighted by demographic characteristics. But our responses broadly capture trends in public opinion.
Kursk seems to have triggered temporary increase in feeling of personal threat and maybe some wavering in support for SMO, but nothing major or conclusive.
See the original Tweet here.